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It is submitted that there is no reason for importing into the law
of evidence a discretion to exclude evidence in dealing with the
type of situation depicted by C.ronkwright v. Cronkwright.` The
English cases and some Canadian cases reviewed above demonstrate that this is so . It is submitted that inadequacies in the existing
law relating to privileged communications should be dealt with by
either legislation or "judge-made law" extending the privilege
rather than by a discretion exercised ad hoc as suggested by Lord
Parker in Attorney-General v. Clough ." Apart from the uncertainty it creates there are other difficulties with the latter approach .
If a privilege exists, it is the privilege of the parties and may be
waived if both parties desire the evidence to be admitted ." A judicial discretion on the other hand, based on public policy, is not
subservient to the wishes of the parties but to that of the public .
Thus an instrument designed to overcome the inadequacies of privilege may result in the exclusion of evidence which both parties
want .
JOHN SOPINKA"'
TRUSTS INTER Vivos-DUTY TO CONVERT UNDER-PRODUCTIVE
PROPERTY-THE EVEN-HAND RULE .--Where under-productive
property is settled by deed on trust for persons in succession, does
the trustee owe a duty to the life tenant to convert the property
into securities producing a higher rate of return? An answer to
this question can, of course, be found in any of the standard
English works on the law of trusts . Unless an intention to the
contrary can be gathered from the terms of the trust instrument
there is no such duty .' The same rule applies to specific bequests
of property on trust for persons in succession' and even to residuary
devises of real estate on such trusts.' It is only with respect to
residuary bequests of personalty that equity has imposed upon the
trustees a duty to convert under-productive, wasting or reversionary property into authorized investments.' The distinction between
Supra, footnote 1 .
"'Supra, footnote 17 .
ai Pais v. Pais, [1970] 3 All E.R . 491.
* John Sopinka, of the Ontario Bar, Toronto.
' See, e.g., Snell's Principles of Equity (26th ed., 1966), p. 236; Underhill's Law of Trusts and Trustees (11th ed., 1959), p. 291; Hanbury's
Modern Equity (9th ed., 1969), pp. 328-329; Halsbury's Laws of England
(3rd ed ., 1962), Vol. 38, p. 880. See also, S. J. Bailey, (1942-43), 7
Conv . (N .S .) 128, at pp . 128-129; Re Van Straube» zee, [1901] 2 Ch . 779.
'Pickering v. Pickering (1839), 4 My . and Cr. 289, at p. 298; Re Van
Straubenzee, ibid ., at p. 782.
3 Re Searle, [19001 2 Ch . 829; Re Darnley, [1907] 1 Ch . 159; Re
Oliver, [1908] 2 Ch. 74.
4 Howe v. Lord Dartmouth (1802), 7 Ves. 137; Re Lennox, [1949]
S.C .R. 446, and many other cases.
I'
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residuary bequests of personalty on the one hand and other testamentary settlements and settlements inter vivos on the other is,
presumably, based on the principle that equity should not impose a
duty to convert where the property has been specifically selected
and appropriated to the trust by the settlor'
These principles are well established and until recently there
was every reason to believe that they qualified the equally well
established principle that trustees are under a duty to hold an even
hand between the persons interested under the trust. Where the
trustees were expressly authorized to retain or convert under-productive or wasting property the position was no different. Thus in
Gray v. Siggers,' short leaseholds were settled on the testator's
widow for life with remainders over. The trustees, one of whom
was the widow, were given power to retain or convert all or any
part of the property as, in their absolute discretion, they might
think fit. It was argued for the remaindermen that the leaseholds
should be sold and that the life tenant should receive the annual
income from the proceeds. Notwithstanding the possibility that
the leaseholds might expire in the widow's lifetime, the court
refused to interfere.' The approach has been similar in cases where
the trustees have been given a duty to convert with a power to
postpone at their discretion. In one such case, hliddleton J.A . said :'
[The delay of the trustees] is in my view entirely without blame for the
testator gave all his property to his widow and the Trust Company
to be held and disposed of by them as directed by his will, and he
authorizes his trustees "to sell and dispose of all or any part of his real
estate . . . as they see fit", leaving the re-investment of the same
entirely to their judgment and discretion . b think this gives to the
executors an uncontrollable discretion which they may exercise, not
only in such manner but at such time as in their judgment they deem
proper, and in the -absence of any suggestion that the power has not
been exercised honestly and in good faith, the executor cannot be said
to have been guilty of any breach of trust.

In none of these situations was it suggested that the even-hand
rule might either impose upon trustees a duty to convert underproductive or wasting property or limit the effect of an express
power to retain . The one exception was the special case of a will
which settled residuary personalty and which contained neither an
express power to retain the property in its original state nor any
other implication that the life tenant was intended to enjoy the
property in specie. In cases other than that just mentioned the evens Underhill, op. cit., footnote 1, p . 291 .
' (1880), 15 Ch . D . 74. See also, do re Nicholson, [1909] 2 Ch . 111 ;
Re Courtier (1887), 34 Ch . D . 136 ; Re Sheldon (1888), 39 Ch . D . 50.
1 "1 cannot look at the question whether the leaseholds are for long
or short terms, because, whether long or short, the widow was to have the
property in specie if the trustees thought fit to retain it" : ibid., at p.77.
'Re Rutherford, [1933] 0 .R. 707, at pp . 725-726 .
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hand rule's main application as between successive beneficiaries
was to act as a brake on any purported exercise by the trustees of
a power to convert and to re-invest.' The court would not enforce
the exercise of the power against the wishes of the trustees but
it would prevent them from exercising the power in order to favour unduly one beneficiary against another .
The principles which have been stated may, of course, be
over-ridden if a beneficiary can establish that the trustees were
guilty of an abuse of discretion in deciding not to sell. An allegation
of this kind may be hard to substantiate if the trustees rely on their
undoubted right to refuse to give reasons for their decision." If it
can be substantiated there is no doubt that the court has power to
intervene even, in appropriate circumstances, to the extent of removing the trustees."
Consider the following cases : (a) the trustees' refusal to convert is actuated by bad faith; (b) the trustees erroneously believe
that they have no power to convert ; (c) the trustees erroneously
believe that, under the terms of the trust instrument, they are
authorized to favour the life tenant over the remainderman or vice
versa . In the first two cases the main difficulties which would have
to be overcome by a beneficiary who seeks the court's intervention
would normally be evidential . In the third case, there might also
be a very real difficulty in establishing that the trustees' belief was
erroneous in law. If specific under-productive property is settled on
persons in succession and the trustees are given a power to retain
the property, there seems to be a clear implication that to that
extent the even-hand rule has been waived and that the fact that
the remaindermen may be favoured to the prejudice of the life
tenant does not in itself impose upon the trustees any duty to convert . If this were not so, the cases which have been referred to at
the beginning of this comment would be inexplicable and the rule
which applies to residuary bequests of personalty would extend to
all settlements whether inter vivos or testamentary . Indeed it is
implicit in those cases, that the absence of an express power to
retain does not affect the matter. As long as the settlement does
not arise by virtue of a residuary bequest of personalty, equity
imposes no duty to convert .
The principles which have been outlined have governed the
practice of lawyers drafting trust documents and trustees administering estates in England and in other parts of the Common'As e .g., in Raby v . Ridehalgh (1855), 7 De G. M. and G. 104 ; Stuart
v . Stuart (1841), 3 Beav. 430 ; Re Armstrong (1924), 55 O.L.R. 639 .
I°Re Beloved Wilkes's Charity (1851), 3 Mac . and G. 440 ; Re Locodonderry's Settlement, [19651 Ch. 918 .

"For general comments on the inherent power of the court to remove a trustee gee Letterstedt v. Broers (1884), 9 App. Cas . 371 ; Re
Wrightson, [19081 1 Ch. 789.
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wealth for a considerable time . For that reason, and quite apart
from the fact that it is not everyday that a trust company is removed from a trust, the implications of the reasoning in the judgments delivered by Keith J. at first instance and Arnup J.A . in the
Court of Appeal of Ontario in Re Smith" are more than a little
disturbing .
In March 1966 the settlor transferred shares of Imperial Oil
Limited to the trust company on trust to pay the income to his
mother for life with remainder to the survivor of his mother and
himself. The trustee was expressly authorized in its sole discretion
(a) to "Retain the Trust Fund in its present form, whether producing income or not" and (b) to "convert into money and bonds,
stocks, shares . . . from time to time in its hands and from time to
time invest the proceeds thereof" in various classes of investments
described in the trust instrument . From March 1966 until August
1969 the trustee paid the annual income from the shares to the
life tenant . This income was considerably below that obtainable
from other securities in which the trustees were authorized to invest .
In August 1969, the life tenant's solicitors requested the trustee
to diversify the portfolio in order to produce a greater return for
the life tenant . The trust company acknowledged the letter and
sought the advice of the settlor through his solicitors . The latter
then wrote to the life tenant's solicitors to the effect that they
would be consulting the settlor and would report back in the near
future . The life tenant's solicitors received no further communication for some nine months and ultimately applied to -the court. The
court was asked to determine (a) whether the trustee was "in
breach of its duty to maintain an even-hand between the life-tenant
and the remainderman by refusing to exercise its power to invest in
securities which would produce a reasonable return" to the life
tenant, (b) whether the trustee was "in breach of its duty to exercise prudence and reasonable care in the investment of the trust
assets by failing to diversify the investments of the trust" and (c)
whether the trustee had "properly exercised its discretion with respect to the investment of the trust assets". An application was also
made for an order removing the trustee.
At first instance Keith J. answered questions (a) and (c)" in
the affirmative and granted an order removing the trustee. The
learned judge rejected the trust company's argument that the terms
of the trust instrument required it to retain the shares of Imperial
Oil Limited and found that the trustee had not maintained an even
hand as between the beneficiaries. The report then continues :'
[19711 1 O.R. 584 (Keith J.) ; [19711 2 O.R . 541 (C .A.) .
13 Question (b) was answered in the negative . No reason for this answer appears in-the report.
"The learned judge cited as authorities the cases in footnotes 9, supra,
12
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Unless there is some provision in the trust agreement which prevents
the trustee from doing so, it seems to me inescapable that the trustee
is in breach of his well-recognized duty to maintain such an investment .

The order for removing the trustee was made on the ground that
the deference which had been shown to the views of the settlor
made it impossible to restore confidence in the original trustee
with respect to the future administration of the trust.
In a judgment delivered orally by Arnup J.A. the Court of
Appeal agreed in substance" with the decision and the reasoning
of the judge at first instance .
On the facts as found by the learned trial judge the decision
that the trustee had failed to exercise its discretion and had thereby
been guilty of a breach of trust is in no way in conflict with the
principles which were stated earlier in this comment. What is disturbing both in the judgment of Keith J. and that of the Court of
Appeal is the treatment of the even-hand rule. It seems to be implicit in both judgments that the fact that the life tenant was receiving a comparatively low rate of return on the investments was sufficient to impose, at least prima facie, a duty to convert and reinvest ." Moreover the fact that the trust instrument expressly authorized the retention of the entire fund "whether producing income or not" was obviously not regarded as conferring power upon
the trustee to hold the scales unevenly to the prejudice of the life
tenant." The finding of the Court of Appeal was that the trust
company was "in breach of its duty to maintain an even-hand between the life tenant and remainderman by refusing to exercise its
power to invest in securities which would produce a reasonable return for the life tenant having regard to her financial circumstances" . Although the finding is not altogether free from ambiguity it does appear to represent more than a decision that the
trustee had failed to exercise its discretion ; it appears rather as a
finding that a conversion and re-investment should have been
made. The even-hand rule was thus treated as governing the way
in which the discretion whether to convert or retain ought to have
been exercised.
If this is a correct interpretation of the reasoning of the learned
a passage from Lewin on Trusts (16th ed., 1964), p. 356, which summarizes the effect of those cases and passages from Underhill's Law of
Trusts and Trustees, op . cit., footnote 1, art. 45(1), p. 273, and Halsbury,
op . cit., footnote 1, p. 972, para . 1683, which contain general statements
of the even-hand rule.
1s
The court found that it was unnecessary to answer questions (b) and
(c) supra and varied the judgment at first instance accordingly .
is
[19711 1 O.R . 584, at pp. 588-589 (Keith J.) ; [19711 2 O.R. 541, at
p. 542 (C.A.) .
l' Neither the judgment at first instance nor that of the Court of Appeal
places any significance on the inclusion of these words.
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judges the case must have some impact on the practice of drafting
and administering trusts, as least in Ontario. The English decisions
and the propositions stated in the English texts can no longer be
regarded as safe and secure guides to trustees empowered to retain under-productive property .
It is of course, possible that one should confine the decision
to its own facts and ignore any implications which the reasoning
of the learned judges might appear to have for trustees who recog
nize the existence of their discretions and make a bona fide attempt
to exercise them . It is very doubtful whether any trustee could
afford to do this and until clarification is obtained much more
attention will have to be given to the insertion of clauses which
will effectively exclude the even-hand principle:" Such attention
will be required notwithstanding the fact that the principle is
obviously grounded in sound policy . In this area, the over-riding
policy is still freedom of disposition and it is submitted that neither
justice to dependants nor justice to the beneficiaries of a person's
bounty will be served adequately by tinkering with principles which
have long governed the interpretation of wills and settlements
inter vivos. To a large extent the content of those principles is a
matter of indifference . What is important is that the principles,
whatever their content, should be clearly stated and consistently
applied. Despite the judgments which were delivered in Re Smith,
settlors will still desire in some cases to authorize their trustees to
benefit one beneficiary at the expense of another. In situations of
the kind discussed in this comment the reasoning in those judgments has complicated unnecessarily the task of the lawyers
engaged in drafting settlements and, more important, has created
doubts as to the obligations of trustees administering settlements
constituted prior to the decision .
MAURICE C . CULLITY *

LANDLORD AND TENANT-REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO LANDLORD
WHEN TENANT WRONGFULLY REPUDIATES LEASE-PROPERTY
LAW OR CONTRACT LAw-THE DEMISE OF Goldhar v. Universal

Sections & Mouldings Ltd.-premises are leased to a tenant
for a term of years . Before the term expires, the tenant, without
justification, repudiates the lease and gives up possession . The
landlord accepts the termination of the lease and sues for damages
"For an example of such a clause see p. G-7 of A More Intelligent
Lawyer's Guide to Drafting Ordinary Wills (1970) (contributed by Mrs .
Bertha Wilson Q .C.) .
* Maurice C . Cullity, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto .

